Letter to the Editor
By Prof James Chin
The demand for Sabah and Sarawak to hold 35 per cent of Malaysia’s parliamentary seats is not merely a political proposition; it is a clarion call for justice, rooted in the historical political understanding that formed Malaysia and fuelled by decades of systemic marginalisation. The Malaysia Agreement 1963 (MA63), which formalised the federation of Malaysia, promised Sabah and Sarawak equal partnership with Malaya, with Sabah and Sarawak as ‘founders’ and not mere states in the new federation.
Yet, for much of the federation’s history, this promise has been betrayed, with Sabah and Sarawak treated as little more than resource colonies for Malaya’s benefit. The refusal of Malayan-based non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to support this 35 per cent seat allocation reveals a persistent colonial mentality, one that seeks to maintain control over Borneo’s political and economic destiny.
The formation of Malaysia in 1963 was not a unilateral act but a negotiated partnership between Malaya, Sabah, Sarawak, and Singapore (until its exit in 1965). The MA63 enshrined specific safeguards to ensure that Sabah and Sarawak would retain significant autonomy and influence. One critical aspect was the allocation of parliamentary seats, intended to reflect the unique status of these Borneo States.
At the time, Singapore, Sabah, and Sarawak were allocated a combined 34 per cent of seats in the Dewan Rakyat. This proportion was meant to guarantee that a constitutional amendment proposed by Malaya could not proceed if one of the three ‘S’ states objected. This was not a random figure but a carefully negotiated commitment to balance Malaya’s numerical and political dominance.
When Singapore left the federation, the right thing to do was to redistribute Singapore’s parliamentary seats to Sabah and Sarawak to maintain the status quo. This was not done, and in subsequent redelineation exercises, Sabah and Sarawak lost their balance and are now left with 25 per cent of parliamentary seats. Malaya can effectively change the Malaysian constitution at will. In fact, this is exactly what happened—if you were to count the number of constitutional amendments, it comes out to slightly more than one annually.
In sum, it does not matter what Sabahans and Sarawakians think; Malaya does not need to consult on constitutional amendments. In fact, Sabah and Sarawak were called ‘fixed deposit’ by Kuala Lumpur for many years—a derogatory term meaning no matter what KL does, Sabah and Sarawak will support.
The demand for 35 per cent representation is thus not a new claim but a restoration of the original intent—an acknowledgement that the original political agreement made prior to the formation of Sabah and Sarawak’s contributions to Malaysia’s economy, culture, and geopolitical stability warrants a significant voice in the federation. Without this, the very foundation of Malaysia as a partnership of equals is rendered hollow.
For the first 50 years of Malaysia’s existence, Sabah and Sarawak were treated not as founder states but as fixed deposits to keep UMNO in power and resource colonies. MPs from Sabah and Sarawak gave BN its two-thirds majority in Parliament. The most glaring example is the exploitation of their oil and gas reserves. From the 1970s to 2013, an estimated RM500 billion worth of oil and gas was extracted from Sabah and Sarawak.
The Petroleum Development Act 1974 stripped Sabah and Sarawak of control over their oil and gas resources. This act ensured that billions in revenue flowed westward, leaving Borneo with paltry royalties—just five per cent—and little say in how their resources were managed. Malayan leaders justified this as necessary for national development.
Sabah’s poverty rate remained among the highest in Malaysia, peaking at 20 per cent in the 1990s, while Sarawak’s rural communities struggled with inadequate infrastructure. Roads, schools, and hospitals in Borneo lagged far behind those in Peninsular Malaysia.
The year 2008 marked a turning point in Malaysia’s political landscape. For the first time, the ruling Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition lost its two-thirds parliamentary majority, relying heavily on MPs from Sabah and Sarawak to remain in power.
Suddenly, Malaya’s political elite began to pay attention to Borneo, not out of genuine respect for MA63 but out of sheer necessity. Promises of decentralisation, increased funding, and greater autonomy emerged, but these were tactical moves to secure Borneo’s votes rather than a sincere commitment to justice.
This shift exposed the fragility of Malaya’s rhetoric on federalism. For decades, Malayan leaders ignored Sabah and Sarawak’s grievances, dismissing calls for fair representation as divisive or unnecessary. Only when their political survival depended on Borneo’s MPs did they begin to acknowledge the imbalances. This opportunism underscores a critical truth: Malaya’s newfound interest in dealing with historical grievances is not a moral awakening but a pragmatic response to political realities. If Sabah and Sarawak’s MPs were no longer needed to prop up federal coalitions in the future, Malaya would likely revert to its old ways, sidelining Borneo’s interests once again. This is the lesson from history.
Malayan NGOs, often vocal on issues of governance and human rights, have been mounting a high-profile campaign on the 35 per cent seat allocation. This campaign is not neutral—it is complicity in a colonial mindset that seeks to keep Borneo subordinate. These organisations, based primarily in Kuala Lumpur with comprador in Kuching, frequently position themselves as champions of justice.
Yet, their failure to advocate for Borneo’s rightful representation reveals a deep-seated bias. They are quick to lecture Sabah and Sarawak on issues like environmental conservation or democratic reforms, but when it comes to empowering Borneo politically, they retreat into silence or outright opposition.
This behaviour reflects a mentality that views Malaya as the intellectual and political centre of Malaysia, with Sabah and Sarawak as mere appendages. By ignoring the 35 per cent demand, these NGOs perpetuate the idea that Borneo’s role is to follow, not lead. Their reluctance to support greater representation stems from a fear that, empowered, Sabah and Sarawak would challenge Malaya’s dominance, forcing a reckoning with the federation’s unequal structure. This is not progressivism—it is gatekeeping, dressed up in the language of national unity.
Sabahans and Sarawakians must recognise the historical and ongoing injustices they have faced and unite to demand their rightful 35 per cent of parliamentary seats. This is not just about numbers; it is about reclaiming the power to shape Malaysia’s future as founder states. The current political moment, where Borneo’s MPs hold significant leverage, is a rare opportunity to correct decades of marginalisation. Failure to act now risks perpetuating the status quo, where Malaya’s interests continue to dominate at Borneo’s expense.
Unity is critical. Sabah and Sarawak must set aside internal differences and present a united front. The MA63 provides a legal and moral basis for their demands, and the economic contributions of Borneo—particularly its oil and gas wealth—underscore their indispensable role in the federation.
The demand for 35 per cent of parliamentary seats for Sabah and Sarawak is a non-negotiable step toward rectifying historical grievances and correcting past wrongs. The silence of Malayan NGOs on this issue exposes their complicity in a mindset that seeks to keep Sabah and Sarawak subservient. The post-2008 shift in Malaya’s attitude is not a sign of respect but a reluctant acknowledgement of Borneo’s political leverage—a leverage that must be seized now.
Sabahans and Sarawakians must stand united, armed with the truth of their history and the strength of their contributions, to demand their rightful place in Malaysia.
James Chin is a professor of Asian studies at the University of Tasmania, Australia.
This is the personal opinion of the author(s) and does not necessarily represent the views of DayakDaily. Letters to the Editor may be lightly edited for clarity.
— DayakDaily
